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FIXING THE "MARRIAGE PENALTY"
PROBLEM
Robert S. McIntyre* and Michael J. McIntyre **
I. INTRODUCTION
One of the vexations of married life in America is the marriage
penalty imposed by the Internal Revenue Code. Virtually all married
couples pay the marriage penalty. That is, marital partners could expect
to reduce their combined income taxes by getting a divorce and entering
into a well-crafted support and property-settlement agreement. As a
practical matter,, few middle- and upper-income couples divorce or fail
to marry simply to avoid an extra tax bite.1 This commitment to
marriage must reflect a triumph of love over money,2 not a failure to
* Director of Citizens for Tax Justice. LL.M. Georgetown University Law Center (1976); J.D.
University of Pennsylvania Law School (1975); B.A. Providence College (1970).
" Professor of Law, Wayne State University. J.D. Harvard LawSchool (1969); A.B.
Providence (1964).
1 The literature suggests that the decision to marry or stay married is not affected strongly
by the marriage penalty, leaving aside the possible impact of that penalty, in combination
with welfare policies, on low-income individuals. See David L Sjoquist & Mary Beth
Walker, The Marriage Tax and the Rate and Timing of Marriage, 48 NAT'L TAX J. 547 (1995)
(finding no effect of marriage penalty on marriage rate); and James Aim & Leslie A.
Whittington, Does the Income Tax Affect Marital Decisions?, 48 NAT'L TAX J. 565 (1995)
(finding strong evidence of a small but statistically significant impact of marriage penalties
on the marriage rate). For a somewhat more pessimistic assessment, made prior to
publication of the studies cited above, see Toni Robinson & Mary Moers Wenig, Marry in
Haste, Repent at Tax Time: Marital Status as a Tax Determinant, 8 VA. TAX REv. 773, 787 n.59
(1989) (suggesting that the impact of the marriage penalty on the decision to divorce or not
to marry is substantially uncertain).
The marriage penalties imposed on some taxpayers by the phase-out of the earned-
income tax credit are so substantial relative to income that they have the potential to
influence the marriage decision. Empirical evidence that these marriage penalties are
discouraging marriage, however, is not available, and speculation on their impact on
behavior is of limited value. See Anne L. Alstott, The Earned Income Tax Credit and the
Limitations of Tax-Based Welfare Reform, 108 HARV. L. REV. 533, 560 (1995) ("A firm
conclusion [that the EITC marriage penalties do not discourage marriage] must await
empirical evidence, but at the outset it seems at least as plausible to expect that the EITC
(like welfare) has little effect on family structure as to predict a dramatic impact.").
2 Rawls asserts that family sharing tends to refute the utilitarian premise that individuals
always seek to maximizing the sum of advantages to themselves. JOHN RAwLS, A THEORY
OF JUSTIcE 105 (1971). Cohabitation among welfare recipients is apparently commonplace,
suggesting that the strong economic incentives in the welfare system in favor of unmarried
status are discouraging low-income partners from marrying. See Robert A. Moffitt, Robert
Reville, & Anne E. Winkler, "Beyond Single Mothers: Cohabitation and Marriage in the
AFDC Program," 35 Demography 259 (1998). See also Stacy Dickert-Conlin, "Taxes and
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seek good tax advice, for few features of the income tax have received as
widespread public attention as the infamous marriage penalty.3
Marriage penalties have been around since the adoption of the
modem income tax in 1913.4 Most of the significant marriage penalties
were temporarily eliminated in 1948 with the adoption of full income
splitting for married couples.5 But major marriage penalties were
reintroduced by the 1969 tax act, which abandoned full income splitting
in favor of marital joint filing with partial income splitting. Those
penalties provoked an explosion of news reports and scholarly writing
on tax issues relating to marriage.6  The 1986 tax act cut back
significantly on most marriage penalties, primarily by cutting tax rates
substantially. The 1993 tax act increased marriage penalties on high-
Transfers: Their Effects on the Decision to End a Marriage," 73 J. of Pub. Econ. 217 (1999)
(finding "weak support that taxes affect the decision to separate.").
3 For early articles on the topic, see, e.g., Grace Blumberg, Sexism in the Code: A Comparative
Study of Income Taxation of Working Wives and Mothers, 21 BUFF. L. REV. 49 (1971) (describing
the marriage penalties introduced by the 1969 tax act and introducing term "marriage
penalty"); Boris I. Bittker, Federal Income Taxation and the Family, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1389
(1975) (suggesting that the marriage penalty introduced by the 1969 tax act results from a
conflict in tax policy goals); Michael J. McIntyre & Oliver Oldman, Taxation of the Family in a
Comprehensive and Simplified Income Tax, 90 HARv. L. REv. 1573 (1977) (offering a principled
defense of a marriage penalty free system based on full marital income splitting); Michael J.
McIntyre & Robert S. McIntyre, Tax on Marriage, Should We Get Rid of It, And, If So, How?,
PEOPLE & TAXES, May 1980; Pamela B. Gann, Abandoning Marital Status as a Factor in
Allocating Income Tax Burdens, 59 TEX. L. REV. 1 (1980) (arguing for the elusive "marriage
neutral" tax system); Michael J. McIntyre, Tax Consequences of Family Sharing Practices Under
New York Law: A Critique and a Proposal for Reform, 49 ALBANY L. REv. 275 (1985) (showing
that the "conflict in principles" that allegedly leads to the marriage penalty is actually a
conflict in empirical assumptions about the economic consequences that typically
accompany marriage) (hereinafter "NY Reform"). For more recent pieces, see Amy C.
Christian, The Joint Return Rate Structure: Identifying and Addressing the Gendered Nature of the
Tax Law, 13 J. L. & POL. 241 (1997); Michael J. McIntyre, Marital Income Splitting in the
Modern World: Lessons for Australia from the American Experience, in TAX UNrrS AND THE TAX
RATE SCALE, 1-33 (John G. Head & Richard Krever, eds. 1996) (hereinafter "Modem World");
Marjorie E. Komhauser, Theory Versus Reality! The Partnership Model of Marriage in Family
and Income Tax Law, 69 TEMP. L. REV. 1413 (1996); Lawrence Zelenak, Marriage and the
Income Tax, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 339 (1994); Marjorie E. Komhauser, Love, Money, and the IRS:
Family, Income-Sharing, and the Joint Income Tax Return, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 63 (1993).
4 This first marriage penalty was caused by granting a personal exemption of $3,000 for a
single person and $4,000 (or $2,000 per- capita) for a married couple. See RICHARD GOODE,
THE INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX 214.
5 Small marriage penalties existed for some taxpayers after the 1948 tax act and before the
1969 tax act. See John Brozovsky & A.J. Cataldo, 1f, A Historical Analysis of the "Marriage Tax
Penalty, 21/1 ACCOUNTING HIsrORIANs J. June 1994, at 163-87.
6 See, e.g., Blumberg, supra note 3; Bittker, supra note 3; McIntyre & Oldman, supra note 3.
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income married couples7 and, while lowering marriage penalties on
some low-income married couples with children, increased penalties on
many other low-income married couples with children. The rejuvenated
marriage penalties have provoked a new explosion of scholarly
commentary, all critical of the penalties and calling for their elimination.8
The Republican majority in Congress has made elimination of
marriage penalties a high political objective. Democrats, including
President Clinton, have also indicated that they think that the marriage
penalties of current law are objectionable. The approach we take in this
Article is to isolate the popular issue of marriage penalty relief from
more contentious issues, such as major tax cuts and major redesign of the
tax system.
We set forth in Section III a proposal for eliminating most marriage
penalties for middle- and upper-income taxpayers without changing the
basic pattern of family taxation that the United States has followed since
1948 and without raising or reducing the overall income tax burden on
Americans.9  Our proposal requires tax increases on some single
individuals and provides tax relief for some married couples. The tax
increases and decreases that we recommend, however, are all
remarkably modest and are offsetting in the aggregate. The change in
the overall distribution of the tax burden among income classes under
our proposal is negligible.
7 The 1993 penalties were created primarily by the introduction of a new top rate of 39.6%
that began at $250,000 for unmarried individuals and married couples filing jointly. The
Clinton Administration, in proposing this rate increase, was aware that it was creating
marriage penalties and that those penalties could be avoided by having the 39.6% bracket
begin for unmarried individuals at $125,000. It chose to impose the penalties, however,
rather than face the political problem of explaining why a tax increase that was advertized
as affecting only the very rich was kicking in at $125,000 for single taxpayers. One
commentator has suggested that the Clinton Administration tolerated large marriage
penalties "for the sole purpose of conforming to a specific combination of revenue and
distributional targets...." See Michael J. Graetz, Paint-By-Numbers Tax Lawmaking, 95
COLUM. L. REv. 609, 612 (1995). We would note that lowering the starting point of the
single rate schedule would have had an imperceptible affect on distribution tables, due to
the very small percentage of single taxpayers reporting income over $125,000.
8 See, e.g., Christian, supra note 3; McIntyre, Modern World, supra note 3; Zelenak, supra note
3; Gene Steuerle, "The Uncertain Support Behind 'Marriage Penalty' Relief," 84 Tax Notes
1539 (Sept. 13, 1999).
9 As explained in Section I.B.3., the penalties under the earned-income tax credit cannot be
eliminated or even mitigated substantially without major changes in the structure of that
credit.
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Our goal in this Article is to present a plan for eliminating, to the
extent feasible, the marriage penalties that the federal income tax system
currently produces. This is our only goal. In contrast to some other
commentators writing on this topic, we do not combine our proposal
with proposals for making other weighty changes in the income tax
system, such as cutting taxes substantially or eliminating marital joint
filing and returning to the pre-1948 system of separate filing for all
individuals. On the contrary, we have designed our reform to be
revenue-neutral and to conform to the tax policy principles currently
embedded in the Internal Revenue Code ("Code"). We do not discuss
the merits of a major tax cut. We discuss separate filing only to explain
why its reintroduction would not do much to eliminate marriage
penalties.
In Section II, we set the stage for an evaluation of our solution to the
marriage penalty problem by discussing the nature and extent of
marriage penalties under current law. We show that all married couples
currently pay a marriage penalty and that the only way to eliminate the
penalty is to return to full marital income splitting. We present a brief
conclusion in section IV.
H. MARRIAGE PENALTIES UNDER CURRENT LAW
In Section II.A. below, we define a marriage penalty and explain
how we would quantify the marriage penalties produced under current
law. Section II.B. describes the three common types of marriage
penalties, shows how they could be eliminated in theory, and explains
why a solution to the marriage penalty problem arising out of the
earned-income tax credit is illusive. In Section II.C. we present our
estimate of the magnitude of marriage penalties produced under current
law.
A. Defining and Quantifying Marriage Penalties
Kim and Bo are married and have a combined income of $50,000.
Their deductible expenditures are moderate, so they elect to take the
standard deduction. Under tax rules applicable for 1998, they would pay
federal income taxes of $5,625. If they were to divorce and split their
income evenly and each of them took the standard deduction, they
would each pay federal income taxes of $2,708, for total taxes of $5,416.
The reduction in taxes of $209 that they could obtain from getting
divorced is popularly called a "tax on marriage" or "marriage penalty."
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For Kim and Bo to be subject to a marriage penalty in the above
example, each must be taxable on some portion of their aggregate
marital income after their divorce. If only one of the former spouses has
income, then the other former spouse would be unable to utilize the
more generous capita tax deductions for single individuals under the
Code. In practice, however, marital partners contemplating divorce can
always arrange their affairs so that each of them is taxable after divorce
on one-half of their aggregate taxable income through the deduction for
alimony. 10 For example, if Bo has earnings of $50,000 and Kim has no
independent income sources, then Bo could deflect $25,000 to Kim by
getting a divorce and agreeing to pay that amount to Kim as alimony
In many cases, marital partners would each have income for tax
purposes after a divorce even without making use of the alimony
deduction for income splitting purposes. If both spouses earn a salary in
the marketplace, for example, then they would be taxable on their
separate earnings after a divorce under well-established case law.1
Similarly, if the spouses held income- producing property jointly, they
would each be taxable after divorce on one-half of the income generated
by that property. More generally, marital partners holding income-
producing property could reshuffle ownership rights of that property to
produce whatever post-marital distribution of property income they
desired.1 2
From the discussion above, it should be clear that virtually all
marital partners in America who decide to get a divorce could arrange
their affairs so that each former spouse would be taxable on about one-
half of the aggregate income of the couple after the divorce.
Consequently, virtually all married couples are in a position to benefit
from the extra per capita deductions and/or lower tax rates provided in
the Code to single persons. That is, if a marriage penalty is defined as
the extra tax burden that married couples pay over what they would be
required to pay as single individuals, then the U.S. tax laws impose a
10 See I.R.C. §§ 215 and 71 (1994) (providing, in tandem, that former spouses can deflect
income for tax purposes from the payor of alimony to the recipient).
11 Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111 (1930).
12 The case-law rule is that income from property is taxable to the person holding the most
important ownership right to that property. See Michael J. McIntyre, NY Reform, supra note
3, at 292. Because property may be owned in many complicated ways, the tax-common-
law rules for determining who is the owner of property for tax purposes are quite ornate.
For property held by trusts and partnerships, the common law rules have been
supplemented or replaced by statutory rules.
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marriage penalty on virtually all married couples, not just some subset of
marital partnerships, such as some two-earner couples.
The presence of marriage penalties in the tax law gives marital
partners an incentive to dissolve their marriage. However, as noted in
Section I, few middle- and upper-income married couples appear to have
responded to that incentive by getting a divorce. The ineffectiveness of
the incentive is not surprising, given the relatively modest size of current
marriage penalties and the major effects of marriage on an individual's
legal and social circumstances. The collateral effects of marriage and
divorce apparently are sufficiently important to married couples that
they are unwilling to change their marital status simply to gain the tax
benefits currently being offered to them.
Some commentators are highly critical of marriage penalties in the
mistaken belief that they have major behavioral consequences. 13
Marriage penalties are objectionable, however, notwithstanding their
relatively minor behavioral implications. Absent some strong tax policy
reason for imposing higher taxes on married individuals than on
otherwise similarly situated single individuals, a marriage penalty is an
unfair and discriminatory tax. Most people would object strongly if the
tax laws specifically stated that married persons must pay an additional
$250 a year in taxes, just as they would object to a special $250 tax on
individuals who regularly attended church. Those special levies
obviously would discriminate unfairly against the persons required to
pay them. The fact that marriage penalties are imposed in a less
transparent fashion does not make them less objectionable.
Marriage penalties presumably would be unobjectionable if they
could be justified on tax policy grounds and they have no measurable
impact on the decision to marry or remain married. Some commentators
have offered a tax-policy defense of marriage penalties. They argue that
married couples ought to pay higher per capita taxes than similarly
situated single individuals on account of the special economies-of-scale
benefits that married couples allegedly enjoy. We are not dissuaded
from our long-time view that the economies-of-scale argument has no
merit. As we have argued in more detail elsewhere, marital partners do
not necessarily enjoy above average amounts of economies-of-scale
13 See, e.g., Rep. Jerry Weller (R-Ill.), The Republican Response to President Clinton's
Weekly Radio Address (Jan. 17, 1998) (claiming that the marriage penalty contributes
significantly to the breakdown of the family, with devastating effects on the life prospects
of children) <http://www.house.gov/weer/radio.html>.
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benefits. 14 Those assumed economic benefits should not be taken into
account in fixing income tax burdens, and the size of the marriage
penalties imposed on individual married couples do not relate in any
systematic fashion to the amounts of their alleged economies-of-scale
benefits. 15 In any event, our goal in this Article is to solve what is
perceived to be the marriage penalty problem, not to define that problem
away.
In computing marriage penalties under current law, we have
compared the tax currently imposed on marital partners with the tax that
they would pay as single individuals if they took advantage of readily-
available mechanisms for equalizing their post-marriage incomes. Not
all commentators take this approach. Others calculate marriage
penalties on the assumption that marital partners who are getting a
divorce to minimize their aggregate taxes would make no changes in the
way they owned their income and property after the divorce. Because of
this assumption, they are led to conclude that two-earner married
couples in which the spouses each have similar earnings are the primary
victims of marriage penalties. 16
We reject the assumption that marital partners who divorce
exclusively for tax reasons would fail to reshuffle their ownership rights
to income and property so as to minimize their taxes after the divorce.
That assumption is unrealistic for at least three reasons. First, it fails to
take into account that the dissolution of a marriage contract will itself
14 In 1997, about 46 million non-dependents over age 19 were classified as single for tax
purposes. That same year, Census reports that only about 25 million people over age 19
lived alone. These figures indicate that at least 45 percent of non-dependent single people
(excluding single parents) lived with someone else in 1997. In fact, leaving out the elderly,
it appears that 56 percent of non-dependent single people lived with someone else in 1997.
Presumably they enjoyed some economies-of-scale benefits from doing so.
The figure above for single non-dependents includes some individuals who didn't
actually file returns. The ITEP tax model calculates that there were 7.7 million non-filers
among the total of 47.8 people classified as single, non-dependents in 1997 (including 1.7
million under age 20). Of that 7.7 million single, non-dependents who did not actually file
tax returns, 5.3 million were elderly. "Non-filers" is somewhat of an arbitrary
classification, because many people file simply to get their withholding back.
15 See, e.g., Michael J. McIntyre, What Should Be Redistributed in a Redistributive Income Tax?
Retrospective Comments on the Carter Commission Report, in THE QUEST FOR TAX REFORM: THE
ROYAL COMMISSION ON TAXATION TWENTY YEARS LATER 197-99 (W. Neil Brooks, ed. 1988).
16 See, e.g., CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, FOR BETrER OR FOR WORSE 27-29 (1997)
(hereinafter "CBO STUDY") (discussing the difficulties of deciding on the proper
"benchmark against which to estimate marriage penalties"). Of the long list of possible
benchmarks discussed, the CBO does not consider the possibility that divorcing couples
would enter into an alimony agreement.
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change marital property rights significantly. For example, a divorce
typically extinguishes the dower rights of a wife and frequently creates
the right of a former spouse to receive alimony and a property
settlement. Those who assume that ownership rights to income and
property will be the same before and after a divorce are treating
marriage as a mere formality rather than a contractual relationship with
real legal and economic substance.
Second, the contested assumption is inconsistent with the way
couples act when they get a divorce that is not motivated primarily by
tax considerations. The normal pattern for divorcing couples is to enter
into a settlement agreement that adjusts the former spouses' ownership
rights to the couples' combined property and income. Often those
settlement agreements are designed to minimize taxes. We see no reason
to assume that happily married couples untying the marriage knot for
tax reasons would be less inclined than antagonistic former spouses to
conspire together against the federal fisc.
Third, we believe that the contested assumption is inconsistent with
what we understand to be the main purpose for computing marriage
penalties. In our view, that purpose is to quantify the amount of the
discriminatory tax imposed on married couples as a result of their
marital status. The actual behavioral responses of married couples to
marriage penalties are not relevant in determining the amount of the
discriminatory tax. What is relevant is the amount of the tax savings that
married couple could obtain if they changed their marital status. In
computing that amount, marital partners who are divorcing for tax
reasons should not be assumed to be oblivious to the tax advantages of
post-marital income splitting.
We recognize, of course, that the income-shifting mechanisms
discussed above may have some negative collateral consequences for
some couples. It is possible, for example, that a husband who was
perfectly willing to support his wife at a particular level might be
disinclined to enter into a binding alimony agreement or property
settlement. The more likely outcome is that tax planners would develop
alimony agreements and property settlements with little binding force
except in the short term. In any event, the predictions of commentators
about the inclination of couples to engage in post-marriage tax planning
is irrelevant in computing marriage penalties, just as the behavioral
responses of married couples to the marriage penalties computed
without reference to post-marriage tax planning are irrelevant.
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B. Major Types of Marriage Penalties
Many features of the federal income tax create potential tax penalties
for some married couples. Other commentators have offered extensive
lists of those marriage penalties.1 7 They can be classified into three major
groups. The first, illustrated by the standard deduction, provide greater
per capita deductions to single taxpayers than to married taxpayers. The
second, illustrated by the rate schedules of current law, impose tax at a
higher rate on the per capita income of married couples (assuming
marital income splitting) than on single persons.
The third type of marriage penalty, illustrated by the phase-out rules
for the earned-income tax credit, phase out some tax benefits more than
twice as quickly for married couples than for single taxpayers. Other
examples of this type include the phase-out rules for the itemized
deductions and exemptions. For our purposes, it is enough to look at
some examples of the major types of marriage penalties. The paradigm
examples of the three major types of marriage penalties are discussed
below.
1. Standard Deduction
The most important "marriage penalty" for the typical married
couple-a couple making up to $60,000 a year who does not qualify for
the earned income tax credit-stems from the fact that the standard
deduction for a married couple is less than the standard deduction for
two unmarried individuals. For filing year 1998, two single persons
without children are granted standard deductions of $8,500 ($4,250 X 2).
A single person and a head of household (generally a single person with
a dependent child) are granted standard deductions totaling $10,500
($4,250 + $6,250). The standard deduction for a married couple, in
contrast, is $7,100.18 That is, two marital partners without children
receive a standard deduction that is $1,400 less than the standard
deduction given to two single individuals without children, and two
marital partners with children receive a standard deduction that is $3,400
17 For a list with a clear explanation of how the penalties operate, see CBO STUDY, supra
note 16, at 15-25.
18 See I.R.C. § 63(c)(2) (1994). The figures in the text have been adjusted for inflation in
accordance with I.R.C. § 163(c)(4) (1994).
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less than the standard deduction given to a single person without
children and a single person with a dependent child.19
Consider, for example, two roommates each earning $20,000. For tax
year 1998, they will pay taxes on $27,500 of combined income if they are
married. They will pay tax on a total of only $26,100, however, if they
choose to divorce or not to marry in the first place. The marriage penalty
caused by this increase in taxable income is $210.20
The marriage penalty illustrated above could be eliminated by
giving married individuals the same per capita standard deduction
granted to unmarried individuals. Under current law, that result could
be obtained by giving married couples without children a standard
deduction of $8,500 and either giving married couples with children a
standard deduction of $10,500 or reducing the standard deduction for
single parents to $4,250 (the same as for singles without children).
The standard deduction serves two distinct purposes in the current
income tax. First, it simplifies compliance problems for electing
taxpayers and the Internal Revenue Service. Taxpayers who elect the
standard deduction do not have to keep track of their deductible
expenditures and the Internal Revenue Service's audit obligations are
reduced. 21 This purpose cannot explain the marriage penalty except on
the assumption that single people typically have larger per capita
deductible expenditures than married people. That assumption,
however, would almost certainly be counterfactual. 22
19 If an urunarried couple has two or more children, they both might qualify for head-of-
household status. In that event, the total of their standard deductions would be $12,500.
20 In 1998, the difference between one joint standard deduction of $7,100 and two single
standard deductions of $4,250 each, for a total of $8,500, was $1,400. Multiplying $1,400 by
the 15% marginal tax rate yields $210.
21 Prior to 1977, taxpayers could claim a standard deduction equal to a percentage of their
adjusted gross income, up to a cap. To simplify reporting requirements for average
taxpayers, the 1977 tax act eliminated the percentage standard deduction and converted the
old caps on the standard deduction into a fixed-amount deduction. See Tax Reduction and
Simplification Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-30, § 102, 91 Stat. 126, 135 (codified as amended at
I.R.C. § 63(d)). A percentage standard deduction does not create a marriage penalty; the
old caps did produce a marriage penalty, but the penalty only applied to married couples
whose income was high enough to cause them to bump again the cap.
22 For the majority of taxpayers, two of the most important deductions are the deduction for
home mortgage interest and the deduction for homeowner real estate taxes. Married
couples are more likely to claim these deductions than single individuals because married
couples are more likely to be homeowners.
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The second purpose of the standard deduction is to provide, in
conjunction with the personal exemptions and dependency exemptions,
a tax-free amount to families that roughly corresponds to the federal
poverty-level amounts for families of different sizes.23 The official
poverty-level figures are computed with very strong assumptions about
economies of scale and do not distinguish whether two (or more) people
living together are married or not. Nevertheless, many tax policy
makers seem to make the implicit assumption that married individuals
enjoy economies-of-scale benefits and single individuals do not.24
Whether that assumption is appropriate in the design of welfare
programs is an issue outside the scope of this Article. As noted above,
we believe that the potential economies-of-scale benefits should not be
taken into account in determining income tax liabilities.
2. Marital Tax Rates
For higher-income couples that typically itemize deductions,
marriage penalties mainly reflect the differing rate schedules for single
and married persons. Those rate schedules can impose higher taxes on a
married person's share of the family income than would apply if the
couple were living without the benefit of legal matrimony. Assume, for
example, that two unmarried individuals living together as a couple each
earn $40,000. The aggregate amount of their income subject to tax
probably would not change much by marriage. If they did marry,
23 The poverty-level figures were developed in the early 1960s. They were based on the
estimated cost of a minimum adequate diet for each type of family. Those cost amounts
were multiplied by three to get the poverty-level budget for each family type. At the time,
food was estimated to make up about one-third of the budget of the average poor family.
The poverty benchmarks are updated annually for inflation by the Census Bureau. The
simplistic methodology has remained the same, however, despite the fact that poor families
now are estimated to spend only one-seventh of their budget on food. For a history and
criticism of the poverty benchmarks, see generally COMMISSION ON BEHAVIORAL AND
SOCIAL SCIENCES AND EDUCATION, MEASURING POVERTY: A NEW APPROACH (1995).
24 The official poverty threshold for a single person in 1998 was $8,300 (with a lower level
for the elderly, at $7,818, than the non-elderly, at $8,480). Adding a second person to a
household raised the poverty threshold by $2,320, adding a third, by $2,130, a fourth, by
$4,060, a fifth, by $3,460, etc., with no discernible pattern. The increments were different
for adding children compared to adding adults, with children sometimes more and
sometimes less. U.S. Bureau of the Census, Poverty Thresholds in 1998, by Size of Family and
Number of Related Children Under 18 Years, (visited Sept. 1, 1999)
<http://www.census.gov/hhes/poverty/threshld/thresh98.html>.
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however, they would pay a higher marginal tax rate on part of their
income, leading to a marriage penalty of more than a thousand dollars.25
The marriage penalties produced by the marital rate schedule-
referred to here as rate-schedule marriage penalties-are a product of the
1969 tax act. From 1948 to 1969, marital partners were each taxed on
one-half of their total marital income at the same rates that applied to
single people. For example, if Bo had income of $25,000 and Kim had
income of $55,000, under the splitting rules they would each have
reported gross income of $40,000 (($25,000 + $55,000) + 2). With
graduated rates, this full-income splitting result often allowed marital
partners to pay less taxes than they would if they were taxable on their
separate incomes. For administrative convenience, this income splitting
result was obtained by allowing married couples to pay tax on their
aggregate incomes under a special rate schedule for married persons.
The widths of the tax brackets on the married-couple rate schedule were
exactly twice the widths of the tax brackets of the rate schedule
applicable to single persons. 26
The 1969 tax act left the married-couples tax rate schedule
unchanged while introducing a more favorable rate schedule for single
individuals. The brackets of the new singles schedule were less than half
the width of the married-couples schedule. As a result, the married-
couples schedule no longer provided the functional equivalent of full
25 After itemized deductions and personal exemptions, the couple's total taxable income
would be about $61,000. As two single taxpayers in 1998, $50,700 of this would be taxed at
15% and the remaining $10,300 at 28%. But as a couple, only $42,350 would be taxed at
15%, and $18,650 at 28%. The additional $8,350 in the 28% bracket adds $1,086 to the
income tax due as a married couple. At joint income levels over $110,000, some marriage
penalties are caused by implicit marginal rates due to various phase-outs and
disallowances, such as starting points for the personal exemption recapture, the itemized
deductions disallowance, and the per-child tax credit phase out. Marriage penalties are
also engendered by the break points governing the taxation of Social Security benefits, the
dependent-care credit percentages (the credit is 30% of expenses up to $2,400 for one child
and $4,800 for two or more children for incomes below $10,000, but falls to 20% for incomes
greater than $28,000), the rules governing the Alternative Minimum Tax, and the rules for
the elderly and disabled credits, among other items.
26 Assume, for example, that marital partners are allowed to split their income and that all
taxpayers are required to pay tax on a rate schedule that taxes the first $20,000 of taxable
income at 10% and all income over $20,000 at 50%. If A and B are married and A has
separate income of $10,000 and B has separate income of $40,000, then each would pay tax
of $4,500 on income of $25,000, for an aggregate tax of $9,000. This same result would be
achieved if A and B were taxable on their aggregate income of $50,000 under a married-
couple rate schedule that taxed married couples on the first $40,000 of income at 10% and
on income over that amount at 50%.
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income splitting. Marital partners could obtain the benefits of the new
single rates schedule, but only by getting a divorce and paying taxes on
their separate incomes under that new schedule. Thus the marriage
penalty. The effect of the revised system was to allow for only partial
income splitting between married couples. 27 Marital partners incurred a
marriage penalty because the income split that was implicit in the
revised joint filing system was less even than the split they could obtain
if the spouses were to divorce and file separate tax returns.
To maximize the tax benefits of getting a divorce, married couples
need to arrange their affairs so that each spouse will be taxable on about
half of their aggregate income after the dissolution of their marriage.
They can achieve that result automatically under current law if both
spouses are working in the labor market, receive equal earnings, and do
not have any other income. Many high-income former spouses can split
their income by shuffling their ownership rights to income-producing
property. As discussed above, married individuals can always arrange
to have equal taxable incomes after divorce by entering into a well-
crafted alimony agreement.
In adopting the 1969 tax act, Congress knew that it was creating
marriage penalties. 28 It attempted to justify those penalties by alluding
to the economies-of-scale benefits allegedly enjoyed by married couples
and not enjoyed by single persons. The political reason for imposing
those penalties, however, was not to tax economies-of-scale benefits. It
was to reduce the so-called marriage bonus created under the prior
system of full income splitting.
A marriage bonus is the reduction in taxes that two individuals with
unequal incomes obtain from getting married under a joint filing system
that allows substantial income splitting between spouses. Assume, for
example, that Bo and Kim are unmarried, that Kim has income of $50,000
and that Bo has income of zero. In a full income splitting system with
graduated tax rates, Bo and Kim would each become taxable on $25,000
if they got married. Kim's tax bill would go down and Bo's would go
up, but their aggregate tax bill probably would go down. 29 Joint filing
27 For discussion of how the 1969 act resulted in partial marital income splitting, see
McIntyre & Oldman, supra note 3, at 1584-85.
28 See STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON INTERNAL REVENUE TAXATION, 91ST CONG., 2D SESS.,
GENERAL EXPLANATION OF TAX REFORM AcT OF 1969 223 (Comm. Print 1970).
29 If both Kim and Bo were in the bottom tax bracket prior to marriage, they would not
obtain a rate- schedule "marriage bonus" from getting married. In general, a widening and
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with partial income splitting also can produce so-called marriage
bonuses, but their frequency and magnitude is reduced. A return to full
income splitting would result in some increase in so-called marriage
bonuses. 30
The term marriage bonus is really a misnomer because the "bonus"
is fully consistent with the theory underlying marital income splitting.
According to that theory, an item of income should be taxed to the
person who enjoys its economic benefits. Thus if income is shared
equally by a husband and wife, they should each be taxable on one half
of that income. The fact that total taxes on two individuals go down
when they marry is consistent with the fact that their enjoyment of
income becomes more equal after marriage. The term marriage bonus is
also a pejorative, biased description of the operation of a set of income-
attribution rules. Analysts who think that a particular income-
attribution rule is wrong should marshal arguments to support their
position. They should not resort to the functional equivalent of name
calling.
It is worth noting that a separate filing system produces marriage
bonuses similar to those produced in an income splitting system.
Assume, for example, that Kim and Bo are subject to tax under a separate
filing regime. Kim has earned income of $20,000 and Bo owns assets that
generate investment income of $120,000. They decide to marry, and after
marriage, they begin to share income in the expected, roughly equal
pattern. They realize that they could reduce their taxes if Bo transferred
some assets to Kim. That transfer would make Kim taxable on some of
the investment income previously taxable to Bo, resulting in lower taxes
on the couple. That self-help income splitting produces a marriage
bonus in that it causes Kim and Bo to pay less in taxes than they were
paying before marriage. Referring to that result as a marriage bonus is
inappropriate, because the so-called bonus is consistent with the
principles of separate filing. In contrast, the term marriage penalty,
although also pejorative, is appropriately used because the imposition of
flattening of the rate schedules reduces "marriage bonuses" and marriage penalties, as
illustrated by the changes in "marriage bonuses" and penalties resulting from the 1986 tax
act.
30 Under current law, marital partners seeking to minimize their taxes and unconcerned
about the marital state would not enjoy the "marriage bonus" for long, as they would
divorce and split their incomes through the deduction for alimony. That is, they would
enjoy a "divorce bonus," not a "marriage bonus."
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an extra burden on couples that marry is generally considered to be an
improper result.
Many commentators claim that adoption of a separate filing system
would eliminate the rate-schedule marriage penalties of current law. 31 In
fact, a separate filing system routinely produces marriage penalties as
long as alimony is taxable to the recipient and not the payer. Assume,
for example, that Bo and Kim are married and are paying taxes in a
separate filing system. Bo has separate income of $60,000, and Kim has
separate income of $10,000. They could minimize the bite of the
graduated tax rates if they got a divorce and Bo began paying alimony of
$25,000 to Kim. The amount they would save from that arrangement
would constitute a marriage penalty.
A separate filing system also produces other types of rate-schedule
marriage penalties. Prior to 1948, Congress attempted to limit
opportunities for marital income shifting within a separate filing system
through remedial rules applicable to certain trusts and partnerships. 32
Those rules continued in effect after the adoption of marital income
splitting in 1948, but with greatly reduced importance. Marital partners
generally can circumvent these anti-avoidance rules by getting a divorce.
In summary, joint filing regimes and separate filing regimes can
produce marriage penalties and "marriage bonuses." In a separate filing
system that employs graduated tax rates, it would be necessary to repeal
the deduction for alimony to avoid marriage penalties. It would also be
necessary to repeal the various provisions of the Code that limit the use
of family trusts, family partnerships, and the like to achieve self-help
marital income splitting. A joint filing system, however, can eliminate
marriage penalties straightforwardly by adopting full marital income
splitting. The systematic favoritism towards marriage produced by a
marital income splitting regime is justified in theory and has the
important benefit of causing equal-income married couples to pay equal
taxes. In contrast, a separate filing system is forced to tolerate self-help
marriage bonuses that undermine the equal treatment of similarly
situated married couples. Thus, within the context of a graduated
31 See, e.g., Zelenak, supra note 3, at 342 (asserting, incorrectly, that '[tlhe only way to avoid
both marriage bonuses and penalties is to abandon marital status as a tax determinant and
to require that spouses file separate returns").
3 2 Examples are the grantor trust rules of I.R.C. § 671 et seq. and the family partnership rules
of I.R.C. § 704(e). For example, the income of a trust that was set up by a husband for the
benefit of his wife would be taxable to the husband.
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income tax and equal treatment of equal-income couples, the only
method available for eliminating the marriage penalties of current law is
to undo the damage done in 1969 and return to full income splitting.
3. Phase-Out of Earned-Income Tax Credit
With one notable exception, the proposal set forth in Section III
would eliminate almost all of the most commonly cited marriage
penalties for the vast majority of couples. That proposal would do
nothing, however, to alleviate the marriage penalties created by the
earned-income tax credit ("EITC"). For low-income taxpayers, the
marriage penalties created by the EITC are important and regrettable.
Unfortunately, we have not yet devised a method for eliminating those
penalties that is consistent with the goals of the credit and with current
political realities.
The EITC is a refundable tax credit targeted at low-income workers.
Most of the benefits are provided to single mothers with dependent
children.3 3 The credit is also available, however, to other low-income
families and, on a very limited basis, to lower-income taxpayers without
dependent children. Taxpayers with incomes over specified income
thresholds are not eligible for the EITC. The EITC is phased out at the
rate of 15.98 cents for each dollar over $12,260 for taxpayers having one
dependent and at the rate of 21.06 cents for each dollar over $12,260 for
taxpayers having more than one dependent (at 1998 levels).
The EITC marriage penalty has two causes: (1) the credit is phased
out over the same income range for both single individuals and married
couples; and (2) the fact that splitting tax custody of children between
unmarried parents in larger families can frequently generate larger
credits than if the parents are married (and no custody splitting for tax
purposes is allowed). Assume, for example, that Jean and Jules are
single individuals with two dependent children and are living together
as an unmarried couple. Each has wages of $12,260 and no other income.
Each of them qualifies for the maximum one-child EITC of $2,271 (in
1998), for a total of $4,542. If Jean and Jules were to marry, their total
two-child EITC would fall to only $1,174 due to the phase-out rules,
computed on their combined income of $24,520. After taking account of
other tax effects, their tax as a married couple would be $3,562 higher
than if they remained unmarried.
3 In 1999, seventy percent of the total earned income tax credits went to unmarried
taxpayers. INSTITUTE ON TAXATIoN AND EcoNoMIc POLIcY TAX MODEL (1999).
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As the example illustrates, the amount of credit lost through
marriage can be very substantial. The incomes shown in the above
example reflect full-time wages of about $6 per hour for each member of
the couple. A marriage penalty of $3,562 is a huge amount at that
income level. For a couple with the same earnings and four children, the
marriage penalty in 1998 was a staggering $5,636-equal to 23 percent of
total pretax income. This is not only unfair, but it may have an impact
on behavior, inducing some single heads of household to decide not to
marry.34
Overall, almost 13 million couples pay an EITC marriage penalty
under current law, with an average penalty of $1,711. In addition, there
are an unknown number of unmarried couples that have forgone
marriage to avoid the penalty.
The marriage penalty problem under the EITC parallels similar
problems in many welfare programs. The EITC was designed in part to
correct for some of the perverse incentives in welfare programs.35 With
regard to marriage penalties, however, the EITC has only worsened an
already intolerable situation.
EITC marriage penalties were made considerably larger in the 1990
deficit reduction act. Prior to the 1990 act, only couples and heads of
household were eligible for the EITC. This meant, in effect, that there
could be only one EITC per household, because married couples get only
one credit and in any given unmarried household, there can be only one
taxpayer who pays more than half the household expenses. The 1990 act,
however, extended the EITC to taxpayers with children who file on the
rate schedule for singles. Thus, an unmarried couple with two children
now can get two EITCs (if both parents meet the income rules).36
34The empirical evidence, however, is not yet in. For discussion, see supra note 1.
3 See Michael J. McIntyre & C. Eugene Steuerle, FEDERAL TAX REFORM: A FAMILY
PERSPECTIVE 36-39 (1996).
36 It does not appear that the drafters of the 1990 act gave careful consideration to the
marriage penalties they were creating when they dropped the head of household
requirement. Instead, they were concerned that taxpayers had been ignoring the head-of-
household requirement under the prior rules (i.e., they were cheating), and to "solve" that
problem, they decided to make the formerly illegal practices legal. In the House report on
the 1990 act, the only reference to why the EITC was extended to single filers with children
is the following-
Concerns have been expressed about the complexity of the EITC and
potential taxpayer compliance problems. Accordingly, the bill
1999] 923
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We made an attempt to eliminate EITC marriage penalties using an
income splitting approach similar to what we outline later in this
Article-that is, by treating each spouse as having half the family income
for EITC purposes, splitting "custody" of children optimally, and letting
each spouse calculate the EITC separately. Preliminarily, as simply a tax
cut for couples (with no offsets), we found that such a plan would cost a
prohibitive $22.1 billion annually, at 1999 levels. Most of the benefits
would go to couples making between $30,000 and $60,0000, who now get
no EITC because their income exceeds the current lin-its. 37 On a
revenue-neutral basis, we calculated that an EITC income splitting
approach would double the total EITC dollars going to couples and
would reduce total ErTC dollars for unmarried taxpayers (mostly single
parents) by 42 percent. The share of total EITC dollars going to
unmarried taxpayers would drop from 70 percent under current law to
only 40 percent.
Converting the EITC from a program dedicated mostly to low-
income single parents to a program mostly benefitting couples is too
drastic a policy change for us to suggest in an article focusing on
marriage penalty issues.38 We emphasize, however, that policymakers
should not ignore the serious marriage penalties that the EITC creates for
millions of families. Some combination of returning to the pre-1990
head-of-household requirement for EITC entitlement and at least partial
income splitting might be a helpful approach toward reducing the EITC
includes modifications intended both to simplify and improve
compliance with the EITC.
House Report, Revenue Reconciliation Bill of 1990, H.R. 5835 (1990) at 13.
By allowing a larger EITC for families with more than one child, the 1993 tax act
mitigated some of the EITC marriage penalties at income levels below $25,000. That
change expanded the penalties significantly, however, at higher income levels.
37 In doing this analysis, we found an apparent conflict with a Congressional Budget Office
statement suggesting that such an approach would cost only $4 billion at 1996 levels. See
CBO STUDY, supra note 16 at 53. We checked with the CBO analysts, however, and they
confirmed that their figure was hugely low due to a combination of descriptive and
modeling errors.
3 See Alstoff, supra note 1, at 560-61
Further, critiques of the EITC's marital disincentives fail to confront the
policy trade offs inherent in designing the EITC or any other
redistributive program. Marriage penalties are a virtually unavoidable
characteristic of income transfers that tailor benefits to need. Although
it is in theory possible to redesign income-tested transfer programs to
avoid penalizing marriage, the necessary changes would compromise
policy goals that many may find more important than marriage
neutrality.
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marriage penalties under current law.39 Or a complete reworking of the
Code's crazy quilt of children's allowances-that now include the EITC,
the dependent's exemption, the $500 per child tax credit, and the head-
of-household filing rules-might be even more pronising.4°
Unfortunately, a comprehensive solution is beyond the scope of this
Article. We hope to return to this issue in a later piece.
C. Magnitude of Marriage Penalties
In this Section, we set forth and explain our calculations of the
marriage penalties that married couples pay under current (1998) law
and contrast our calculations with those made by the Congressional
Budget Office ("CBO") 41 in a widely-cited recent.study.42 The CBO study
represents a serious effort at quantifying marriage penalties under the
current Code.43 The results of our calculations of marriage penalties
differ significantly, from the results reported in the CBO study. The
reasons for those differences are discussed below.
To compute marriage penalties and bonuses, analysts must make
some assumptions about the features of an alternative tax system-a
benchmark system-in which married individuals would file separate
39 In 1998, House Ways and Means Committee member Richard E. Neal, D-Mass.,
introduced H.R. 3995, which would reduce the EITC marriage penalty by providing for
partial income splitting in the phase-out rules for married couples. The bill would increase
the phase-out of the credit by $ 3,500 for joint filers with qualifying children.
40 See McIntyre & Steuerle, supra note 35, at 38-39. See also Jonathan Barry Forman, What
Can Be Done About Marriage Penalties, 30 FAM. L. Q. 1, 12 (1996) (discussing a proposal by
Rep. Thomas E. Petri (R-Wis.) for replacing a portion of the EITC with a child tax credit that
would be phased out at moderate-income levels).
41 CBO STUDY, supra note 16. For other attempts at measuring the magnitude of marriage
penalties, see R. Wayne Counts & Craig G. White, Lower-Income Families and the Current
Marriage Tax Penalty Proposal, 83 TAX NOTES 1063 (1999); Stacy Dickert-Conlin & Scott
Houser, Taxes and Transfers: A New Look at the Marriage Penalty, 51 NAT'L TAX J. 175 (1998);
Laura Wheaton, Low-income Families and the Marriage Tax, 81 TAX NOTES 125 (Oct. 5, 1998);
James Aim & Leslie A. Whittington, The Rise and Fall and Rise.. of the Marriage Tax, 49 NAT'L
TAX J. 571 (1996); Daniel R. Feenberg & Harvey S. Rosen, Recent Developments in the
Marriage Tax, 48 NAT'L TAX J. 91 (1995).
See, e.g., James D. Bryce, Symposium A Critical Evaluation of the Tax Crits, 76 N.C. L. REV.
1687, N. 57 (1998); Nancy J. Knauer, Heteronormativity and Federal Tax Policy, 101 W. VA L.
REV. 129 n. 7 (1998).
43 Of course, the CBO STUDY gives only a snapshot of the marriage penalties imposed on a
couple in any given year. In practice, the circumstances of married couples typically
change over time, particularly when and if they have children and one spouse chooses to
forgo all or some earnings to stay home with the children. Thus under CBO's mode of
analysis, for tax purposes, many couples would prefer to be married in some years and
unmarried in others.
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returns. On this point, we are in full agreement with the CBO study.
According to the CBO study, the marriage penalties and "bonuses" that
it computed "are simply the calculated differences between the taxes
married couples pay under current law and the taxes they would pay if
they had to file individual tax returns given specific assumptions about
the division of incomes, itemized deductions, and dependent exemptions
between spouses." 44 The CBO calculated the marriage penalties and
"bonuses" of current law (1996) by reference to several alternative
benchmark systems. The advantage of this approach is that it allows
reasonable inferences to be drawn about the relative importance of
various features of the current tax system that create marriage penalties.
In calculating marriage penalties and "bonuses," the CBO assumed
that married individuals filing separately under its various benchmark
systems would compute their separate incomes under the following
income-attribution rules:4
(1) Marital partners would each be taxable on their own earned
income.
(2) Marital partners would determine the amount of investment
income that they would be taxable on by employing a splitting
formula. Under that formula, the aggregate investment income
of the marital partners would be divided between them in
proportion to their earnings.
(3) Marital partners claiming itemized deductions would determine
the amount of their allowable itemized deductions also by
formula. Under that formula, the aggregate itemized deductions
of marital partners would be divided between them in
proportion to their earnings.46
The following example illustrates how these rules would operate.
Assume that Kim and Bo are married, that Kim has earned income of
$60,000 and Bo has earned income of $20,000, that they have aggregate
investment income of $12,000, and that they have allowable deductions
4 CBO STUDY, supra note 16, at 28.
45 Income-attribution rules are the rules for linking items of gross income subject to tax to
the person taxable on those income items. For discussion of the taxonomy of tax rules, see
Michael J. McIntyre, Implications of Family Sharing for the Design of an Ideal Personal Tax
System, in THE PERSONAL INCOME TAX: PHOENIX FROM THE ASHES 145-83 (Richard Bird and
Sijbren Cnossen, eds. 1990).
46 CBO STUDY, supra note 16, at 28.
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of $8,000. Kim would report earned income of $60,000 and investment
income of $9,000, and would claim itemized deductions of $6,000. Bo
would report earned income of $20,000 and investment income of $3,000.
In lieu of allowable itemized deductions of $2,000, Bo would claim the
standard deduction of $4,000.
Using the above income-attribution rules, the CBO developed
several benchmark systems, three of which we discuss below. Under
what we call Scenario #1, the CBO computed marriage penalties and
bonuses on the assumption that married individuals would compute
their separate tax liabilities using the current rate schedule for single
persons.47 They would not be allowed to use the more favorable head of
household schedule, even if they had a dependent child who would
qualify them for using that schedule under current law. Nor would they
be allowed to ignore the income of their spouse in computing the earned
income tax credit. Under this scenario, the CBO calculated for tax year
1996 that:
(1) If marital partners were allowed to compute their separate tax
liabilities using the rate schedule currently limited to single
individuals, 13.9 million married couples would have been able
to reduce their income taxes. The elimination of these marriage
penalties would have saved married couples an average of $612
each in taxes for 1996, for a total tax saving of $8.5 billion.
(2) If all marital partners were required to file as two single
taxpayers, 31.4 million other married couples would have been
required to pay additional taxes. The elimination of these so-
called marriage bonuses could have cost married couples in
additional taxes an average of $1,424 each, for a total cost to
them of $44.7 billion.
47 In a modified version of Scenario #1, the CBO also calculated marriage penalties and
"bonuses" on the assumption that married couples that chose to file separately would be
permitted to allocate all itemized deductions to the higher-earning spouse, with the lower-
earning spouse taking the standard deduction. Under that rule, married couples favorably
affected by separate filing would save an additional $11.4 billion in taxes, whereas the
adverse effects on couples of mandatory separate filing would be cut by $0.7 billion. See
CBO STUDY, supra note 16, at 28-29. These revenue effects are probably driven by the fact
that this rule would allow many more married couples to take both itemized deductions
and a standard deduction. The CBO does not emphasize these results, apparently because
it assumed that few people would find it equitable to allow married couples to claim the
full amount of their itemized deductions and also to claim a standard deduction.
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(3) The net benefit to married couples as a group of using the
married couples rate schedule instead of each spouse filing
separately using the singles rate schedule was $36.2 billion. That
is, married couples as a group paid substantially less in federal
income taxes than they would have paid if all spouses had filed
separate returns under the rate schedule currently available only
to single individuals.
Under Scenario #2, the CBO made the same assumptions it made in
Scenario #1 except that, for married couples with children, one or both
separate filing spouses would be allowed to claim head of household
status. Under that scenario, the number of married couples that would
have been better off in 1996 from filing separately rather than jointly
would have increased from 13.9 million to 17.8 million. At the same
time, the number of couples that would have been adversely affected by
mandatory separate filing would have declined from 31.4 million to 27.3
million. Total marriage penalties under Scenario #2 would have
increased by $8.5 billion, to $17.0 billion, whereas so-called marriage
bonuses would have declined to $33.2 billion. According to the CBO, the
net benefit to married couples as a group of filing jointly under current
law rather than filing separately under Scenario #2 was $16.2 billion.
This amount is $20 billion less than the net marriage bonuses under
Scenario # 1.
Scenario #3 examines marriage penalties and "bonuses" by
indulging the assumptions of Scenario #2 plus an assumption that
separate filing spouses would be allowed to compute their allowable
earned-income tax credit based on their individual earnings. Not
surprisingly, this scenario resulted in very large additional marriage
penalties. According to the CBO, marriage penalties would be increased
for 1996 by $11.8 billion and so-called marriage bonuses would be cut by
$0.3 billion. In total, 20.9 million couples would have paid $28.8 billion
less in taxes in 1996 under Scenario #3, and 25.3 million couples would
have paid $32.9 billion more in taxes.
In summary, by the CBO's count, the single largest cause of marriage
penalties, measured in terms of their dollar value, is the earned-income
tax credit, creating total marriage penalties of $11.8 billion. Tied for
second place are the more favorable head-of-household filing rules (for
couples with children) compared to joint filing and the more favorable
single filing rules compared to joint filing, each producing aggregate
marriage penalties of $8.5 billion. Notwithstanding these substantial
penalties, the CBO concluded that married individuals as a group save
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more total dollars by filing jointly than they lose from paying the
marriage penalties. 48 That is, according to the CBO study, so-called
marriage bonuses outweigh marriage penalties by $4.1 billion.
In calculating the size of the marriage penalties under current law,
the CBO defined what it meant by a marriage penalty and specified the
features of its benchmark system. In both respects, it made questionable
choices, given the policy objectives of its study. Because we used a
different marriage penalty definition and specified our benchmark
system differently, our results differ significant from the results reached
by the CBO.
The CBO defines a marriage penalty from the perspective of two
unmarried individuals contemplating matrimony. For such individuals,
the prospective marriage penalty is the additional taxes that they would
be required to pay each year if they tied the marital knot. This definition
is perfectly sensible if the reason for measuring marriage penalties is to
determine the extent to which the tax system gives unmarried couples a
financial disincentive to marry. That is not our reason for calculating
marriage penalties, however, and it does not appear to be the reason
why the CBO undertook its study of marriage penalties.
We define a marriage penalty from the perspective of a married
couple contemplating the potential tax benefits from getting a divorce -
what the CBO characterizes as a "divorce" model.49 In our view, the
primary tax policy objection to marriage penalties is not their potential
impact on unmarried couples, but their actual impact on the tax burdens
of the much larger number of individuals that remain married.5° The
question we attempt to answer is how much could currently married
couples save in taxes by getting divorced.5' That is, a "marriage penalty"
48CBO's findings were immediately seized on and distorted by Congressional Republicans,
whose press releases and speeches in recent years have frequently asserted that "the
average married working couple pays almost $1,400 more in taxes" because of the marriage
penalty. See, e.g., Rep. Jerry Weller (R-Ill.), The Republican Response to President Clinton's
Weekly Radio Address (Jan. 17, 1998) <http://www.house.gov/weller/radio.html>.
These misstatements conflict sharply, of course, with CBO's actual finding that the average
married couple enjoys a marriage "bonus."
49 CBO STUDY, supra note 16, at 28.
50 A major objective of the CBO STUDY is to calculate the aggregate marriage penalties
actually paid by married couples under current law. The CBO is being inconsistent in
defining marriage penalties in terms of the potential burden on unmarried couples and
then measuring them with respect to the actual burden on married couples.
51 In fact, the whole concept of the marriage penalty first gained public attention in the
seventies when a few couples notoriously engaged in a ritual of well-timed divorces,
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is synonymous with a "divorce bonus" under the definition we have
adopted.
Of course the two definitions have a lot in common. Under both
definitions, the causes of the marriage penalty are the same. It is the
amounts and distribution of the marriage penalties that differ. Those
differences are very large.
Under the CBO definition, marriage penalties are an issue primarily
for two-earner couples, because an unmarried couple with only one
primary earner typically would pay less rather than more in taxes after
marriage.52 Under the definition we have adopted, all married couples
pay a marriage penalty because all marital partners are presented with
the opportunity under current law to reduce their aggregate taxes after
marriage by divorcing and entering into an alimony agreement.53 That
is, almost every married couple now paying income taxes could cut its
tax bill substantially by divorcing with a legally binding (but annually
renegotiable) separation agreement to split income and deductions in an
optimal fashion.54 We explained in section lI.A. why we believe that the
computation of marriage penalties and bonuses should take into account
remarriages, re-divorces, etc., for the stated purpose of cutting their taxes. In some of these
cases, the IRS actually challenged the admittedly tax-motivated divorces as "shams." See
Boyter v. Comm'r, 668 F.2d 1382 (4th Cir. 1981) (successfully challenging legal significance
of a divorce obtained in Haiti in late 1975 followed by remarriage in Maryland in early 1976
* and a divorce obtained in late 1976 in the Dominican Republic followed by remarriage in
Maryland in early 1977); see also Rev. Rul. 76-255,1976-2 C.B. 40 (1976).
52 Many other analysts have seen marriage penalties as primarily an issue for two-earner
couples in which each spouse earns a significant share of the total family income. See, e.g.,
Bruce Bartlett, The Marriage Penalty: Origins, Effects and Solutions, 80 TAX NOTES 1341 (1998)
(stating marriage penalties result only when both spouses have earned income and that
single-earner couples never pay a penalty and in fact always get a bonus from the Code);
Dorothy A. Brown, The Marriage Bonus/Penalty in Black and White, 65 U. CIN. L. REV. 787
(1997) (stating marriage penalties are the greatest where there are two wage earners;
marriage bonuses are the greatest where there is only one wage earner).
50 Each of the authors has written extensively, and critically, about the many arguments
that have been put forward over the years in support of more favorable treatment of two-
job couples versus one-job couples. Many of the arguments in support of two-job couples,
particularly those based on theories about trying to tax the "imputed income" of stay-at-
home spouses, logically apply with at least equal force to single people, although they are
rarely invoked on behalf of singles.
5 Alimony is deductible by the payer and taxable to the recipient. I.R.C. §§71, 215. There
do not appear to be any strong legal limitations on the ability of spouses to craft whatever
alimony agreement they prefer and to renegotiate that agreement to suit their needs at a
later time. Expenses eligible for itemized deductions can easily be allocated by agreement.
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the income splitting opportunities available through the alimony
deductionss
The main difference between our basic benchmark system and the
one employed by the CBO is in the choice of the income-attribution rules
and deduction-allocation rules that would apply to married individuals
filing separate returns. The CBO rules, summarized above, would
require marital partners to split their unearned income and deductions
by formula. Our basic benchmark system employs the income-
attribution rules and deduction rules of current law. Marriage penalties
calculated under our approach are larger because the CBO approach
would deprive spouses of the tax-planning benefits that unmarried
couples can obtain under current law by shifting ownership rights and
rights to deductions.
Our basic benchmark system is proper if the reason for calculating
and aggregating marriage penalties is to measure the extra amount in
taxes that married couples pay on account of their decision to stay
married. That is, we have chosen our basic benchmark system for the
same reason we adopted a divorce model in defining marriage penalties.
In crafting its basic benchmark system, the CBO was not assuming
that marital partners would flunk Tax Planning 101. It apparently was
motivated by a political judgment that Congress, if it enacted a marital
separate filing rule, would not permit marital partners the opportunities
for self-help tax reductions that they were able to obtain under pre-1948
law.s6 This judgment may or may not prove to be correct. We do not
believe, however, that the magnitude of marriage penalties under
current law should depend on the political judgment of the analysts
calculating them.57
55 None of the proposals currently before Congress for dealing with the marriage penalty
would repeal the alimony deduction. The Armey/Shelby flat-tax proposal, which was
proposed as a replacement for various federal taxes, including the income tax, called for
repeal of the alimony deduction. The apparent goal was improved administrative
compliance. The flat-tax proposal is now moribund. For discussion of the problems that
would be created for former spouses from repeal of the alimony deduction, see McIntyre &
Steuerle, supra note 35, at 47-48.
56 See CBO STUDY, supra note 16, at 28 (asserting that these assumptions "would more likely
reflect possible changes that Congress might make to alter the tax treatment of married
couples" than an assumption that marital partners would be allowed to file separately and
take advantage of tax planning opportunities currently available to unmarried couples).
57 The CBO apparently believes that Congress would not be so irresponsible as to reinvent
the pre-1948 system of full separate filing, given the horrendous administrative problems
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We also note that the CBO's benchmark system would itself create
marriage penalties. That is, if Congress were to enact that benchmark
system, marital partners with uneven amounts of earned income and
significant amounts of unearned income could save significant amounts
in taxes by getting a divorce and shuffling their property rights to their
income-producing property. To measure the magnitude of the marriage
penalties under the benchmark system, analysts would need to create an
improved benchmark system. We suggest that the improved benchmark
system would be the one we have used here to calculate marriage
penalties.
We have calculated marriage penalties using our basic benchmark
system, our definition of marriage penalties, and the additional
assumptions that the CBO indulged in what we have labeled Scenario #1
above. That is, our calculations assume that marital partners would be
permitted to file separate returns using the singles rate schedule of
current law. We have not computed marriage penalties under Scenario
#2 (allowing married couples with children to use the head-of-household
schedule) or Scenario #3 (allowing married individuals to compute their
EITC as if they were unmarried).
Under our version of Scenario #1, marital partners who got a divorce
would always be able to report equal taxable incomes after the divorce,
for reasons discussed above. The distribution of tax burdens under that
scenario, therefore, would be exactly equivalent to the distribution of
burdens that would arise in a tax system that allowed for full marital
income splitting and generally gave equal per capita tax benefits to
similarly situated single and married individuals. Full splitting would
be achieved by using the singles rate schedule of current law as the basic
rate schedule and constructing a rate schedule for married couples with
tax brackets exactly twice as wide as the singles brackets.
In Table 1, below, we set forth the results of our simulation under
our version of Scenario #1 for tax year 1998. The potential tax savings
shown in that table are large. They reflect the magnitude of the tax
penalties imposed under current law. Alternatively, they can be seen as
the potential divorce bonuses that married couples could obtain from
severing their marriage bond. We calculate that the federal government
and tax-avoidance opportunities it would create. Other analysts, however, are prepared to
believe that Congress would so act, and have urged it to do so. See, e.g., EDWARD J.
MCCAFFERY, TAXING WOMEN 5 (1997). We would hope that Congress would act
responsibly and refuse to adopt either version of separate filing.
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would lose more than $42 billion annually if it eliminated marriage
penalties by following our version of Scenario #1. The median tax cut in
our simulated divorce scenario ranges from $38 for couples making $10-
$20,000, to $233 in the $40-50,000 range, up to $7,599 for couples making
more than $200,000.
In doing our simulation, we set the following items for couples at
double the current single amounts: the rate-bracket widths, the standard
deduction (including the add-on per person standard deduction for the
elderly and the blind), the personal exemption recapture starting points,
the itemized deductions disallowance starting points, the per-child tax
credit phase out, the break points governing the taxation of Social
Security benefits, the dependent care credit rate phase-down table, the
rules governing the Alternative Minimum Tax, and the rules for the
elderly and disabled credits. s8 Our estimate of potential divorce bonuses
can be considered understated, in that we do not change the combined
filing rules for the earned-income tax credit (Scenario #3).
Table 1
Elimination of Certain Marriage Penalties
Combined with a $42 Billion a Year Tax Cut
By Making the Married Tax Brackets Double the Width
of Current Single Brackets (etc.)
Married Taxpayers
Income % of Mar. Tax Cut Average % of
Group Returns $-billions Tax Cut Total Cut
<$10,000 3.4% $ -0.0 $ -5 0.0%
$10-20,000 10.3% -0.2 -38 0.5%
$20-30,000 14.0% -0.8 -105 2.0%
$30-40,000 11.9% -1.2 -175 2.8%
$40-50,000 12.2% -1.6 -233 3.9%
$50-75,000 23.3% -7.8 -587 18.4%
$75-100,000 11.6% -7.6 -1,151 18.0%
$100-200,000 9.5% -8.4 -1,535 19.7%
$200,000+ 3.4% -14.7 -7,599 34.7%
ALL 100.0% $ -42.4 $ -741 100.0%
58 For technical reasons, we did not adjust the $3,000 limit for capital losses.
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Our estimate of the marriage penalty or potential "divorce bonus" is
accurate in measuring what particular couples are forgoing today by
refusing to sever their marriage bonds. Like the CBO simulations
discussed above, our version of Scenario #1 compares what married
couples pay now compared to what they would pay if certain marriage
penalties were eliminated and overall federal taxes were reduced
substantially. Table 1 simply shows that taxes would be lower if taxes
were lower-a claim that is true, but not edifying. It does not indicate
how much married couples should expect to save under a reformed
Code that eliminated most marriage penalties and raised the same
revenue as current law.
In a revenue-neutral tax reform, taxes would need to be raised on
some taxpayers to make up for the revenue lost by eliminated the tax on
marriage. Because married couples pay about three-quarters of all
income taxes, they certainly would be required to pay a significant part
of the offsetting tax increase. If the tax increase were apportioned pro
rata among taxpayers with respect to the amount they were currently
paying, married individuals could expect to pay approximately three-
quarters of that tax increase.
Suppose, for instance, that the cost of marriage penalty relief is
covered by simply imposing a six or seven percent surtax on all
taxpayers. Then what might start off as a $42 billion a year gross tax cut
for married couples would end up as only about a $13 billion net cut for
them-accompanied by a $13 billion tax increase on unmarried taxpayers.
Under the slightly more sophistical revenue-neutral solution to the
marriage penalty presented in Section III, the typical married couple
making $50,000 a year would pay about $117 less in taxes, whereas the
typical single taxpayer would pay additional taxes of about $67 a year.
As the example above illustrates, revenue-neutral policy changes to
get rid of the marriage penalty would provide far less tax relief to
married couples as a group than the sum of all the tax cuts that
individual married couples could obtain if they decided to divorce. That
is, the "tax on marriage" is much less than the sum of its parts. The
results shown in Table 1, therefore, should not be interpreted as
reflecting the changes in tax burdens that would result from adoption of
full marital income splitting. On the contrary, they reflect the potential
tax savings available to married couples from self-help income splitting
under the partial splitting system of current law.
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Some commentators have asserted that adoption of full marital
income splitting would favor the wealthy.5 9 That claim is potentially
correct in the context of a major tax reduction tilted toward the well off,
as Table I illustrates. But in the context of revenue-neutral reform,
income splitting need not be a windfall to the wealthy, as the tax reform
plan presented in section M demonstrates. In other words, those who
see income splitting as favoring the rich apparently are envisioning the
type of tax change shown in Table 1, in which adoption of marital
income splitting is combined with a large tax cut. But it is the tax cutting
part of that approach that favors the wealthy, not the adoption of marital
income splitting. As the following section shows, income splitting can be
implemented with no change in either revenues or the overall
distribution of the tax burden.
m. PROPOSED SOLUTION
A. General Plan
Our basic proposal for fixing the marriage penalty is to tax married
couples as if each spouse were a single person earning half the total
family income. This "income splitting" approach would not be a radical
step-after all, as noted earlier, it was the law in the U.S. from 1948 until
it was repealed in 1969. The arithmetic for achieving full marital income
splitting is considerable more complicated than in 1969, however, due to
the many phase-out rules that Congress has added to the Code over the
past 15 years.
Marital income splitting makes the reasonable assumption that
married partners share the total family income about equally, with the
result that each individual spouse has about the same ability-to-pay
taxes as a single person with half the family income.6° Current law, in
59 See, e.g., Neil Brooks, The Irrelevance of Conjugal Relationships in Assessing Tax Liability, in
TAX UNITS AND THE TAX RATE SCALE 35,36 (John G. Head & Richard Krever, eds. 1996)
In Canada, and my impression is in Australia as well, one type of
group that perennially raises the issue of moving to a system of family
taxation is the type that represents high-income single-earner families,
such as law and other professional associations. The rich men
traditionally represented by these groups stand to gain a good deal
from a system of family taxation. In Canada, for example, lawyers and
other individuals earning $100,000 a year could save over $10,000
annually in taxes if they were allowed to split their incomes for tax
purposes with their non-income-earning spouses.
Id.
6 See Michael J. McIntyre, MODERN WORLD, supra note 3, at 2:
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contrast, randomly assumes marital income-sharing splits of between 60-
40 and 80-20 in most cases, an approach that is hard to defend on any
logical or empirical basis.
Undoing what was done in 1969-and returning to the pre-1969
system of income splitting for married couples-combines several
compelling advantages. Those advantages include the following:
(1) Full marital income splitting is the only system that can
eliminate most of the marriage penalties for middle- and upper-
income taxpayers. Our proposal does not eliminate the EITC
marriage penalties, but neither does any other proposal under
consideration. Adoption of a separate filing system would
further complicate the problem of fixing the EITC marriage
penalties because the EITC is family based and must remain so
to achieve its policy goals.
(2) Our plan requires married couples with equivalent incomes to
pay the same amount in taxes. This goal-that equal-income
couples pay equal taxes-has been a pillar of the federal income
tax for over half a century and appears to have widespread
popular support. In a separate filing system, couples with equal
incomes can pay widely different amounts of tax.
(3) Using marriage as the bright-line test for sharing makes an
income splitting system easy to administer. Almost all taxpayers
are fully familiar with their marital status. A separate filing
system can be complex to administer, due to the need to policy
intra-marital transactions conducted for tax-avoidance purposes.
(4) Marital income splitting has a firm underpinning in tax policy
principles, combining respect for married and unmarried
persons as individuals with conformance to the most commonly
recognized pattern of income sharing within a marriage.
The case for marital income splitting rests on one normative
proposition and one empirical proposition. The normative proposition is
that the proper taxpayer on income is the person who enjoys the benefits of
that income through personal consumption or savings. This proposition
may be referred to as the "benefit principle" or the "enjoyment
principle."...The empirical proposition is that marital partners typically
share approximately equally in the material benefits financed by income
derived through their marital partnership.




Using the Institute on Taxation and Economic Policy Tax Model, we
have designed a plan to eliminate the marriage penalty while
minimizing dislocations among taxpayers. At 1998 levels, our plan
would incorporate the following features.
(1) Tax Rates. Our plan adjusts the tax rate brackets by raising the 28
percent starting point for married couples from $42,350 to
$46,000. The other married brackets are kept about the same.
The width of the brackets of the rate schedules for singles and
head of household are set equal to half the new married
brackets. See Table 2 for details.
Table 2
Rate Schedules, Current Law and Revised (Revenue Neutral) Plan
Income Rate Plus tax Income Rate Plus tax
($) of ($) ($) of ()
Married Filing Jointly, Current Married Filing Jointly, Revised
- 15% - 15%
42,350 28% 6,353 46,000 28% 6,900
102,300 31% 23,139 102,000 31% 22,580
155,950 36% 39,770 155,000 36% 39,010
278,450 39.6% 83,870 280,000 39.6% 84,010
Single, Current Single, Revised
15% 15%
25,350 28% 3,803 23,000 28% 3,450
61,400 31% 13,897 51,000 31% 11,290
128,100 36% 34,574 77,500 36% 19,505
278,450 39.6% 88,700 140,000 39.6% 42,005
Head of Household, Current Head Household, Reised
15% - 15%
33,950 28% 5,093 23,000 28% 3,450
87,700 31% 20,143 51,000 31% 11,290
142,000 36% 36,976 77,500 36% 19,505
278,450 39.6% 86,098 140,000 39.6% 42,005
Married Filing Separatel , Current Married Filin Separately, Revised
15% 15%
21,175 28% 3,176 23,000 28% 3,450
51,150 31% 11,569 51,000 31% 11,290
77,975 36% 19,885 77,500 36% 19,505
139,225 39.6% 41,935 140,000 39.6% 42,005
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(2) Standard Deductions. Our plan increases the married standard
deduction from $7,100 to $8,200. It cuts the singles standard
deduction modestly, from $4,250 to $4,100, which is one-half the
amount provided under our plan for married couples. And it
cuts the head of household standard deduction significantly,
from $6,250 to $4,100. The result under our plan is to give the
same per capita standard deduction of $4,100 to married
couples, singles, and heads-of-household. In addition, we
equalize the extra per-person standard deduction for the elderly
and blind at $950. The per capita amounts under current law are
$850 for married persons and $1,050 for unmarried persons.
(3) Phase-Out Rules. The phase-out starting points under current
law for the personal exemption, itemized deductions, and child
tax credit are modified significantly under our plan. For married
couples, the starting point for the phase out of the personal
exemption is increased from $186,800 to $200,000. It is decreased
for singles and heads of household to $100,000, from $124,500
and $155,650, respectively. For married couples, we increase the
starting point for the disallowance of itemized deductions to
$140,000, from $124,500 under current law. We cut the starting
point for singles and heads of household to $70,000, from
$124,500 under current law.
With respect to the child tax credit, we make no change in the phase-
out starting point for married couples, which is $110,000 under current
law. We lower the starting point for the per-child tax credit for singles
and heads of household to half the $110,000 married amount. That is, we
reduce the starting point to $55,000, from $75,000 currently.
We do not attempt to adjust for all features of current law that can
produce a marriage penalty. The most important omission is our failure
to adjust the phase-out rules for the earned income tax credit.61 The
other omissions are of relatively minor significance. 62 The adjustments
that we do propose for the standard deductions and phase-out rules are
presented in Table 3.
61We discuss the reasons for this important omission in Section l.B.3.
62 In addition to the EITC omission, our plan does not adjust: the thresholds for the taxation
of Social Security benefits, the table for computing the dependent-care credit rate, the
Alternative Minimum Tax, the elderly and disabled credit rules, and the $3,000 limit on
annual capital loss deductions. The plan could be refined to make some of these
adjustments.




Standard Deductions and Phase-Out Rules,
Current Law and Revised (Revenue Neutral) Plan
Tax Provision Current Law [ Revised
Standard Deduction:
Married Couples $7,100 ($3,550 per capita) $8,200 ($4100 per capita)
Singles $4,500 $4,100
Head of Household $6,250* $4,100
Extra Standard Deduction, Elderly and Blind:
Married Couple $1,700 ($850 per capita) $1,900 ($950 per capita)
USnarried $1,050 $950
Phase-Out Starting Points of ersonal Exemptions:
Married Couples $186,800 $200,000
Singles $124,500 $100,000
Heads of Household $155,650 $100,000
Phase-out Starting Points of I temized Deductions:
Married Couples $124,500 $140,000
Singles $124,500 $70,000
Heads of Household $124,500 $70,000
Phase-Out Starting Points Of cons Tax Credit:Married Couples ]$110,000 $110,000
SinglesI $75,000 $,55,000
Heads of Household $75,000 $5,000
The distributional impact of the revised system is modest on typical
married and single taxpayers. The typical married couple, making
$50,100, would get a tax cut of $117. The typical single taxpayer without
children, making $18,900, would pay $19 more in taxes. The amount and
direction of these changes is consistent with our position that the
distribution of tax burdens under current law is skewed somewhat in
favor of single taxpayers.
The typical single parent (head of household), making $20,500, does
not pay any taxes under current law and would not under our plan. At
that income level, a head of household would get a tax refund, due to the
refundable feature of the earned-income tax credit. Under our plan, the
net tax refund drops by $204, from $1,011 to $807. That reduction is
comparable to a tax increase of around one percent of income. Giving
equal per capita standard deductions to all taxpayers is necessary to
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prevent marriage penalties. It is also sound tax policy, given the
objectives of the standard deduction.63
The reduction in the standard deduction for single parents is the one
feature of our plan that might be viewed as unduly harsh. We
recommend that reduction reluctantly, and only after exploring methods
of giving compensating relief to all low-income families through a
reformed earned-income tax credit or through the dependency
deduction. We concluded that any offsetting tax relief for single parents
should await more fundamental reform of the EITC. Recent tax
legislation has treated low-income single parents quite favorably, but
without giving adequate attention to the impact on marriage penalties of
tax relief directed specifically at single parents. Our proposal for some
reduction in the head-of-household standard deduction might be seen as
a technical correction to that legislation."
In aggregate terms, married couples would pay $13.3 billion less in
taxes under our plan. Single taxpayers would pay $6.8 billion more, and
heads-of-households would pay $6.6 billion more. Eighty-four percent
of the tax increases on singles and 69 percent of the tax increases on
heads of household would be paid by the upper 20 percent of these
taxpayer groups. Chart 1 shows the impact of the revised system on
unmarried taxpayers (single individuals and heads of household) and
married taxpayers across the income spectrum.
63For discussion of those objectives, see supra Section II.B.2.
64 No one should oppose our plan simply because it recommends that single parents lose
their more favorable standard deduction. Retention of the larger standard deduction for
head of household filers would not have a major impact on the integrity of our plan. That
step would not be cost-free, but the costs would be relatively small. There would be a
modest revenue loss, and marriage penalties would be revived for some couples with
children.




Eliminating the "Marriage Penalty"
Tax Changes as Shares of Income (revenue-neutra plan)
11 Marred U Unmarred
U
4M%
Lowed 20% ,eoosd 20% IDDLE 20% Fourl 20% Top 20%
For the vast majority of couples, our program eliminates almost all of
the most commonly cited marriage penalties with one notable exception:
the marriage penalties created by the earned-income tax credit. As noted
earlier, the earned-income tax credit marriage penalty issue is very
important, but we have not yet devised a solution for it.65 The
distributional impact of our plan relative to current law is summarized
in Table 4.
6s See supra section ll.B.3.
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Table 4
Effects of Plan to Eliminate the Marriage Penalty
By treating married couples as two singles, each with half the family income
(Brackets, Deductions, Phase-outs, Etc. Are Adjusted to Be Revenue-neutral)
Income Income Range Average % with Average Tax Cut Tax Cut/
Group Income Cut Income
Tps w All
Cut I
Lowest 20% Less than $26,000 $ 17,300 23.8% $ -151 $ -36 -0.2%
Second 20% $26,000 - 42,000 33,700 71.0% -163 -116 -0.3%
$42,000 - 60,000 50,100 67.0% -175 - -0.2%
Fourth 20% $60,000 - 85,000 70,500 78.8% -507 -400 -0.6%
Next 15% $85,000 -163,000 110,500 92.6% -532 -493 -0.4%
Next 4% $163,000- 409,000 236,400 86.5% -761 -659 -0.3%
Top 1% $409,000 or more 1,086,000 88.1% -695 -613 -0.1%
ALL 66.3% $ -351 $ -232 -0.3%
Income Income Range Average % ith Average Hike Tax Cut/
Group Income Hike Income
Tps w All
Hike
Lowest 20% Less than $9,600 $ 6,400 17.7% $ +28 $ +5 +0.1%
Second 20% $9,600-15,500 12,500 50.3% +55 +28 +0.2%
$15,500 - 23,000 19,300 76.4% +88 +0.3%
Fourth 20% $23,000 - 36,000 28,600 83.1% +167 +139 +0.5%
Next 15% $36,000 - 63,000 45,800 92.6% +586 +543 +1.2%
Next 4% $63,000 -129,000 81,000 95.3% +980 +935 +1.2%
Top 1% $129,000 or more 317,000 89.7% +4,148 +3,722 +1.2%
ALL 63.4% $+318 $ +202 +0.8%
Income % of all Net Tax % with Avg Tax % with Avg Tax Average
Group Returns Change Tax Cut Cut, Tps Hike Hike, Tps Change
$billion with with All Tps
<$10,000 12.9% $ +0.1 1% $ -76 17% $ +30 $ +5
$10-20,000 21.0% +0.7 6% -113 46% +71 +26
$20-30,000 17.8% +0.6 19% -152 53% +104 +26
$30-40,000 11.2% +1.2 36% -166 43% +332 +83
$40-50,000 9.4% +1.6 45% -165 37% +584 +140
$50-75,000 14.0% -0.6 54% -385 22% +771 -36
$75-100,000 6.2% -2.3 79% -527 12% +957 -297
$100-200,000 5.0% -1.3 82% -551 11% +2,150 -218
$200,000+ 1.8% +0.2 74% -786 11% +5,957 +93
ALL 100.0% $ - 31% $ -351 34% $ +318 $ -
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C. Comparison of Our Plan to Current Congressional Proposals
Our proposal for ending the marriage penalty is similar in concept to
several legislative proposals in Congress. We look briefly here at three
of those proposals. The first, H.R. 3734,66 was sponsored by Reps. Jerry
Weller (R-Ill.), David McIntosh (R-Ind.), Wally Herger (R-Cal.) and Bob
Riley (R-nd.). The second is included in H.R. 2488,67 the major tax-cut
bill approved by the House and Senate on August 5, 1999. The third,
H.R. 2020,68 was introduced by Rep. Nancy L. Johnson, R-Conn. These
three proposals are based on a partial return to the pre-1969 system of
taxing married couples as if each spouse were a single person earning
half the total family income.
H.R. 3734, would have increased the married tax brackets and the
married standard deduction to double the singles amounts. Unlike our
plan, H.R. 3734 did not adjust other marriage penalty-causing tax
provisions.
H.R. 2488, the tax-cut legislation approved by the House and Senate
on August 5, 1999, would increase the standard deduction for couples to
double the single amount, although that change would not be fully
phased in until 2005. It would raise the starting point for the 28 percent
tax bracket for couples to double the single amount, with the change
phased in between 2005 and 2008. Finally, it would raise the top of the
phase-out for the EITC for couples by $2,000, starting in 2006. President
Clinton has announced that he will veto the bill, due to what he
considers its excessively large tax cuts. The bill is expected to be sent to
President Clinton in September. 69
H.R. 2020 is the least ambitious of the three bills. It would increase
the married standard deduction to double the current single standard
66 H.R. 3734, "The Marriage Tax Elimination Act," has apparently been withdrawn by its
sponsors in favor of more limited legislation, H.R. 6, which is similar to the marriage-tax
provisions of H.R. 2488.
67 TAXPAYER REFUND AND RELIEF AcT OF 1999.
68 Tax Relief for Working Americans Act of 1999. Cosponsors include W&M colleagues
Arno Houghton, R-N.Y., Dave Camp, R-Mich., Phil English, R-Pa., and Mark Foley, R-Fla.
Companion legislation was introduced in the Senate as S. 1160 by Sen. Charles E. Grassley,
R-Iowa; it is cosponsored by Dianne Feinstein, D-Calif.
69 See Ryan J. Donmoyer, Congress Clears and Keeps Its $792 Billion Tax Cut, 84 TAX NOTES 807
(1999) (reporting that the bill is "doomed" because of President Clinton's promise to
"refuse to sign any plan that signs away our commitment to America's future.")
Apparently it was the tax cut part of the bill, not the marriage penalty relief, that doomed
the bill.
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deduction. This change would reduce marriage penalties primarily for
middle-income families.
Although there are some similarities between our plan and the
Congressional proposals, there are also some fundamental differences.
Rather than adjusting both the married and unmarried rules to maintain
current revenues and progressivity, H.R. 3734's sponsors would combine
marriage penalty relief with a huge tax cut, mainly benefitting those at
the top of the income scale. Thus, their bill would simply cut taxes on
married couples without any offsets. Two-thirds of their proposed .$31
billion a year tax cut would go to the upper 20% of married couples, with
average incomes of $184,000 each. A comparison between our plan and
H.R. 3734 is provided in Table 5.
Table 5
Effects of Eliminating the Marriage Penalty
Avera e Married Tax Cuts Under Two Approaches
Married Income Range Average Tax Cuts, 1998
Income Income
Group
H.R. 3734 Our Plan
Lowest 20% Less than $26,000 $ 17,300 $ -44 $ -36
Second 20% $26,000 - 42,000 33,700 -143 -116
Middle 20% $42,000 - 60,000 50,100 -144 -117
Fourth 20% $60,000 - 85,000 70,500 -685 -400
Next 15% $85,000 - 163,000 110,500 -1,047 -493
Next 4% $163,000 -409,000 236,400 -2,259 -659
Top 1% $409,000 or more 1,086,000 -10,884 -613
Notes: Tax cuts under H.R. 3734 are not offset, and therefore entail a
$31 billion dollar a year reduction in government revenues. The
smaller net tax cuts for marrieds under our revenue-neutral plan are
offset by higher taxes on unmarried taxpayers. The tax increase on
the typical unmarried taxpayer is $67.
Rep. Johnson's proposal, H.R. 2020, is far less costly than H.R. 3734-
only about $6.5 billion a year. Like our plan, it is not distributionally
tilted toward the top of the income scale. But it leaves much of the
marriage penalty in place.
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H.R. 2488 provides marriage penalty relief at a level somewhere
between the two other Congressional plans. It would provide that relief
only at the end of a long phase-in period. Its distributional effects would
be mixed. It provides some relief at the low end of the income scale and
substantial relief at the top. Its revenue consequences would be
substantial, about $19 billion a year in forgone tax revenue at 1999 levels
by fiscal 2008.
In summary, our plan eliminates almost all of the marriage penalties
affecting middle- and upper-income taxpayers. It is revenue neutral and
distributionally neutral. It requires small tax increases on most
unmarried taxpayers. H.R. 3734 provides substantial marriage penalty
relief, but at a heavy cost in forgone revenue and distributional inequity.
It is much more a tax cut for upper-income taxpayers than a marriage tax
relief measure. The other two proposals fail to provide a comprehensive
solution to the marriage penalty problem.
IV. CONCLUSION
Our analysis demonstrates that the marriage penalty is generally not
as intractable a problem as many have claimed. Eliminating the
marriage penalty does not require major tax reductions, or a shift in tax
burdens in favor of the well-to-do, or abandoning the progressive
income tax. All that is required is a modest adjustment in the relative tax
burdens of married and unmarried taxpayers. We highlight the fact that
only relative burdens need to be adjusted by formulating a revenue-
neutral plan. Most of the competing plans combine marriage penalty
relief with a major tax cut for the well-to-do. We do not address here the
issue of upper-income tax reductions, except to insist that commentators
should not conflate that issue with marriage penalty relief.
Many commentators have been mislead by the reports of huge
aggregate marriage penalties into believing that any revenue-neutral
reform would necessarily entail very large tax reductions for married
taxpayers with very large tax increases on others. As we have noted
above, however, the marriage penalty is far less than the sum of its parts.
Under any plausible revenue-neutral reform that eliminated the
marriage penalty, the married persons receiving tax relief from
elimination of the penalty also would have to pay most of the offsetting
tax increases required to pay for the cost of that relief. As our simulation
illustrates, the net effect of the tax cut and the tax hike is likely to be
small in most cases.
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The plan we have devised eliminates most marriage penalties, other
than those created by the earned-income tax credit rules. Reforming the
EITC to eliminate tax biases against marriage is very important, but the
problem is complex and we have not yet been able to solve it. Our plan
does not require major increases or decreases in taxes for most taxpayers,
although most taxpayers would have their taxes go up or down by some
modest amount under our plan. Any revenue neutral plan that seeks to
implement a policy change must make some changes in relative tax
burdens; otherwise, the reform would be pointless. We can note that if
our plan were adopted, it would by the first tax reform in memory that
did not add to the complexity of the Code.
We do not delude ourselves into thinking that our plan for fixing the
marriage penalty problem will meet with universal approval. We expect
that some people who detest the income tax might want to keep the
marriage penalty around, in hopes that it will help discredit the income
tax in the minds of some taxpayers. We expect that some supporters of
separate filing do not want the problem solved unless it is solved
through the elimination of the joint filing rule of current law. As we
have noted above, separate filing systems have their own marriage
penalty problems. Most separate filing advocates, however, think
otherwise. At least some of them might not want to see public support
for joint filing strengthened through the elimination of its one unpopular
feature. Finally, those who hope to use marriage penalty relief as an
excuse for high-income tax cuts will not be pleased with our plan, since
we show that there is no logical connection between these two objectives.
For those who genuinely want to solve the marriage penalty
problem, however, our plan should have considerable appeal. Those
who favor marital joint filing should see our plan as an appropriate fix to
a major flaw in the current system of family taxation. Even those who do
not particularly like joint filing should favor a principled and effective
joint filing system over a defective one. For those who disbelieve some
of the stories about huge federal surpluses in our future, our plan allows
them to support tax justice for married couples without supporting a tax
cut they do not think the country can afford. Our plan should also be
reassuring to those who want parents to marry and provide a secure
environment for their children and who fear that marriage penalties are
discouraging marriage. For us, our plan is appealing because it is fair
and simple, and because it fixes a problem that has been allowed to
fester for far too long.
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